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INSTRUCTING THE DEADLOCKED JURY:
SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Historically, few aspects of a criminal proceeding have so
perplexed jurists as a jury which is unable to reach a verdict.
In the latter part of the eighteenth century Blackstone noted that
in order to avert the pitfalls of this dilemma, jurors should be
"kept without meat, drink, fire or candle . . . till they are all unanimously agreed." Furthermore, the deadlocked jurors were to
be loaded into an oxcart and carried about with the judge while
he rode circuit, being permitted to leave only when they had
agreed upon a verdict.' Progressive jurists in this country disdained such abusive practices and contrived more subtle techniques for exhorting recalcitrant jurors. Thus a request by a
deadlocked jury for a dismissal was denied by the trial court and
the jury informed that it would be kept together for the remain2
ing three weeks of the term unless it could agree on a verdict.
Other juries have been admonished that there would be no food
or water until a verdict is returned,3 that the meals of the jurors
would be furnished at their own expense 4 and, on one occasion,
that they would be kept together several days with only one meal
a day unless agreement was reached. 5 Error has been found in
informing the jury that the trial court would take the jury to
another county where the judge was going to hold a term of
court, 6 as well as threatening in mid-winter to deny the jury of
water and heat while they continued to deliberate. 7 In Lively
v. Sexton8 an Illinois jury which stood eleven to one was instructed in the following manner:
Gentlemen, you will retire and further consider this case,
and . . . if I find that any juror has stubbornly refused to do
his duty or wilfully tried to bring about a disagreement so as
to interfere with the administration of justice, I will send him
to jail for contempt of court. 9
1. 3 W.

See State v. Jeffors, 64
2. Chesapeake & 0. R.R. v. Barlow, 86 Tenn. 537, 8 S.W. 147 (1888).
3. Pope v. State, 36 Miss. 121 (1858).
4. Henderson v. Reynolds, 85 Ga. 159, 10 S.E. 734 (1889).
BLACKSTONE,

Mo. 376, 381 (1877).

COMMENTARIES 375.

5. Hancock v. Elam, 62 Tenn. (3 Baxt.) 33 (1873); Fairbanks, Morse

& Co. v. Weeler, 15 Colo. App. 268, 62 P. 368 (1900).
6. Spearman v. Wilson, 44 Ga. 473 (1871).

7. Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419
(1941).
8. 35 Ill. App. 417 (1890).
9. Id. at 419. In addition to instructions which chastise the jury for
intransigence, trial courts have been found to have informed jurors that
a hung jury is the product of such factors as the jurors' perversity, egotism, lack of intelligence as well as unfitness for jury service. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1154, 1160 (1972) and cases cited therein.
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Admittedly these are old cases and few courts today would
favor the use of similar instructions, nevertheless these and other
similar instances aptly attest to the proposition that it has not
been uncommon for a frustrated trial judge to employ a few
choice words as a pragmatic device to prod a verdict out of an
apparently deadlocked jury. In many criminal prosecutions a
deadlocked jury is the inevitable result of the requirement of a
unanimous verdict beyond a reasonable doubt; it is, however, the
ardent desire of the trial judge, the prosecution and the defense
that the proceeding reach a definitive conclusion. If indeed the
"fruit of every litigated cause rests in the result",10 the consequence of a mistrial springing from a deadlocked jury should be
avoided if such an objective can be realized without prejudicing
the rights of an accused. It is difficult to state with certainty
the number of criminal jury trials occurring each term, much less
the frequency of hung jury mistrials which result. However, ig
1966 it was reliably estimated that as few as fifteen percent of
all felony prosecutions involved a jury and no more than five
percent of all jury trials, roughly three thousand a year, ended
in a mistrial from a hung jury." Echoing the results of research
conducted by the Chicago Jury Project, the AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION PROJECT ON MINIvUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

has estimated that of all the felony cases which reach the stage of
formal prosecution three-fourths are disposed of without trial
and only three out of five of those which do go to trial are tried
before a jury. Consequently, only approximately one-seventh of
all felony prosecutions result in a trial by jury. 2 Early in 1974,
the Office of State's Attorney in Cook County asserted in its annual report that of 6,136 felony prosecutions disposed of in the
preceeding year only 255, or about one twenty-fourth, involved
a trial by jury. Assuming arguendo the reliability of these data,
it would appear that the deadlocked jury situation-though certainly an important phenomenon in terms of sheer numbers-is
not one of particularly large proportion viewed within the context of all criminal proceedings. The occasional deadlocked jury
should not intolerably burden the administration of justice. Furthermore, there are compelling arguments that a hung jury,
though evidence of an infirmity of our system of justice in one
respect, is a vital safeguard to the rights of an accused.
I think a mistrial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liberty.
In many areas it is the sole means by which one or a few may
stand out against an overwhelming contemporary public senti10. Chicago City Ry. v. Shreve, 128 Ill. App. 462, 478 (1906).
11. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 18, 453 (1966).
12.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JuRY 1, 2 (Approved Draft 1968).
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ment. Nothing should interfere with its exercise. 13
In a similar vein, it has been urged that a mistrial is "as much
a part of the jury system as a unanimous verdict"' 4 and that a
defendant has a right to rely on the possibility of disagreement
by the jury selected to determine his fate. 15 These arguments,
however, have not been well received in recent years by those
courts of review which have had occasion to review the permissibility of instructions given to a deadlocked jury. None of the
federal courts of appeal has prohibited supplemental instructions for the purposes of inducing further deliberations, and although the state courts have not been in agreement on the form
and content of a permissible supplemental charge, not one prohibits the giving of such an instruction.
Since a genuinely deadlocked jury will ultimately lead to a
mistrial, there are compelling reasons why such a mistrial should
be avoided. Where the jury in a federal criminal prosecution has
been discharged because of its inability to agree on a verdict, it
has been uniformly held that a retrial of the accused for the same
offense will not violate the federal double jeopardy prohibition
of the Fifth Amendment. 6 The Illinois courts have reached a
similar result under the state constitution. 7 Thus once a deadlocked jury is discharged and a mistrial is declared, both the
prosecution and the defense must undergo the financial and emotional burden of preparing for retrial. This burden would be
particularly oppressive on a defendant with limited resources although in most instances the retrial would be equally burdensome on the prosecution. An evidentiary consideration-that
some evidence may be of such a type as never to be presented
again so well,' 8 the expense to the taxpayer upon whom the bulk
of the cost of retrial will ultimately fall and the public interest
in the prompt administration of justice demand that a deadlocked
jury not be required to grope without the benefit of permissible
13. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Brown, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 484
(2d Cir. 1963).
14. Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1964); cf.
Orr v. State, 40 Ala. App. 45, 52, 111 S.2d 627, 633 (1958) ("A jury is
not a mere committee to explore and bring in majority and minority
reports.").
15. United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 1968).
16. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); Keerl v. Montana,
213 U.S. 135 (1909). For a recent statement of when mistrial will not
preclude retrial in a criminal proceeding for the same offense see Illinois
v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
17. People v. Mays, 23 Ill. 2d 520, 179 N.E.2d 654 (1962). The significance of this holding has been overshadowed by the subsequent application of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
18. Note, Supplemental Jury Charges Urging a Verdict-the Answer
Yet to be Found, 56 MINN. L. REV. 1199, 1230 (1972) and cases cited
therein.
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guidance from the trial court. Though courts are in agreement
that some type of supplemental instruction is proper, the cases
in recent years have done little to elucidate the proper form such
an instruction should take or under what circumstances such an
instruction will be improper and should not be given.
As a practical matter, the decision whether to instruct a
deadlocked jury in the hope of initiating further productive deliberations, to discharge the jury without more, or to simply require that the jury return to its chambers and continue its deliberations (or non-deliberations) is one which rests ultimately
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. 19 Review courts
often use the word "ultimately" when describing this discretion
of the trial judge, intimating that the trial court will frequently
desire to weigh the relative merits of the alternatives before it.
Consequently, at this time, it is probable that counsel for either
side may find himself in a position to express an opinion on the
advisability of a supplemental instruction and, in so doing, may
seize the opportunity to submit to the trial court alternative
courses of action for its consideration.
At this juncture, both the defense and prosecution must evaluate the alternatives available and the prospects for a favorable
determination.
These considerations will not always be the
same. For instance, a mistrial arising from a deadlocked jury
would place a great financial burden on the accused yet the expense of retrial may not be significant when compared to the
criminal liability that may be imposed in the event the defendant
is convicted. Similarly, if the original trial has been a long one,
the prospects of retrial may sufficiently diminish the litigious
19. In several states the manner in which the trial court may dispose
of jury requests for additional instructions is governed by statute. See,
e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 427 (1958); IOWA CODE § 784.2 (1962); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1138 (1956). Illinois cases hold that although additional
instructions may be given in a criminal proceeding after the jury has retired, the state's attorney and defense counsel must be present and given
an opportunity to submit additional instructions. See, e.g., People v.
Harmon, 104 Ill. App. 2d 294, 244 N.E.2d 358 (1968). The length of time
that a jury in a criminal case may be kept together after its failure to
reach a verdict is also within the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., People
v. DeFrates, 395 Ill. 439, 70 N.E.2d 591 (1946) (jury dismissed after a
3-day trial when it had deliberated only 45 minutes). To guide the trial
judge in such circumstances the American Bar Association recommends
the following:
When considering whether to declare a mistrial after the jury
reports its inability to reach a verdict, the judge should consider not
only the report of the jury, but also the complexity of the issues,
the quantum of testimony and other evidence, the number of defendants involved, any requests of the jury for clarification of instructions and the amount of time involved in the deliberation of the jury
to that point.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 77 (Approved Draft
1972).
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zeal of the prosecutor which may enhance the prospects of favorable plea-bargaining. However, the reverse is also true for if the
preparation and ordeal of trial has been long and arduous, a mistrial and the attendant retrial may likely make the accused
amena-ble to settlement. Conceivably, the prosecution and the
defense may each view a supplemental instruction as a device
likely to end the litigation in favor of its client. Even where
counsel acknowledges the merits of a supplemental instruction,
further consideration must be given to the proper timing of its
delivery to the jury. Not unlikely is a situation where counsel,
recognizing the usefulness of a supplemental instruction as an effective tool for initiating productive deliberations, desires that no
instruction be given at that moment, preferring instead that the
jury be allowed to continue its deliberation for a short time. In
short, prosecution and defense alike may find their position
vis-a-vis instructing the jury not a consistent one, fluctuating as
the circumstances of the case unfold.
THE

DYNAMITE CHARGE:

ALLEN AND ITS PROGENY

Eighty years ago in Allis v. United States20 the Supreme

Court of the United States approved the "familiar practice" of
giving supplemental instructions to a jury unable to arrive at a
verdict. Shortly thereafter, in Allen v. United States21 the Supreme Court was called upon to approve the use of such a device
where the jury in a murder trial had been unable to reach a verdict. Defendant Allen, having obtained reversals of his two
previous convictions based on instruction errors, was tried a third
time and convicted. Appealing to the Supreme Court, Allen
urged that the trial court erred in giving further instructions to
the jury when it had returned to the court for additional instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, approved the
additional instruction, and paraphrased the language of the trial
court as follows:
[I]n a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not
be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of
each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to
the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the
case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen,
with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments;
that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting
juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one
which made no impression upon the minds of so many men,
equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the
20. 155 U.S. 117, 123 (1894).
21. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
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other hand the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought
to ask themselves whether they might reasonably doubt the
the correctness of the judgment which was not concurred in by
22
the majority.
This paraphrase, which has since come to be known as the
Allen charge, has been variously referred to as the "dynamite
charge," the "shotgun charge," the "nitroglycerin charge," and on
one occasion, the "third degree instruction, ' 2 all of which aptly
surmise the import of the instruction-to thrust a verdict out of
a jury otherwise unable to agree. Cases and commentary criticizing the Allen charge are numerous, and the trend among those
who have grappled with the instruction favors adopting some
other alternative. Among the recurring themes criticizing the
dynamite charge is that the instruction is given after an impasse
has arisen i.e., when the deliberations have taken a majorityminority quality and that the Allen instruction directs the minority to reconsider the correctness of its judgment in view of the
opinion of the majority. The instruction contains no counterpart
admonition to the majority and it is likely that a frustrated jury
will perceive the import of the court's charge to be the return
of a unanimous verdict-not upon voting one's conscience based
upon the evidence. 24 A likely interpretation of the minority
jurors is that the court is adopting the majority view as the correct view and that it is permissible for the minority to surrender
its own thinking and adopt that of the majority. Instructing a
criminal jury to doubt the correctness of the judgment which was
not concurred in by the majority, to listen with deference to the
majority, and to reconsider its position accordingly dilutes the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The thrust of the
charge admonishes the dissenting jurors that the return of a
22. Id. at 501 (emphasis added). The Allen charge is restated in W.
LABuY, Manual on Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D.
523, 611 (1963) [hereinafter cited as the LaBuy Instruction]. In addition
to the original Allen charge language quoted in the accompanying text,
the LaBuy Instruction appends this additional provision:
If you should fail to agree on a verdict the case must be retried.
Any future jury must be selected in the same manner and from the
same source as you have been chosen, and there is no reason to believe that the case would ever be submitted to twelve men and
women more competent to decide it, or that the case can be tried
any better or more exhaustively than it has been here, or that more
or clearer evidence could be produced on behalf of either side.
23. United States v. Sawyer, 423 F.2d 1335, 1347 (4th Cir. 1970)
(Sobeloff, J., dissenting) citing Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754,
759 (5th Cir. 1962); Leech v. People, 112 Col. 120, 123, 146 P.2d 346,
347 (1944); State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 431, 321 P.2d 202, 204 (1958).
A West Virginia court of review has viewed the Allen charge as the
"hanging instruction" in Levine v. Headlee, 148 W. Va. 323, 134 S.E.2d
892 (1964).
24. Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123, 143 (1967); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739-41 (5th Cir. 1966) (Coleman, J.,
dissenting).
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unanimous verdict depends upon their assent to the majority
position-a consideration having no evidentiary basis and absent
an instruction that a genuinely deadlocked verdict is permissible,
intimates that the trial will not end until either a verdict of
guilty or not guilty is returned.
DEFUSING THE DYNAMITE CHARGE:

RECENT DEVOPMENTS IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Although the Allen charge has enjoyed wide acceptance in
state as well as federal courts, the cases in recent years indicate
a growing disenchantment with the instruction, and the courts
are not as enthusiastic toward the Allen language as they had
been. In 1968, the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON IViNIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

impressed by the growing

body of opinion that the charge is in most instances coercive, disapproved the use of the Allen instruction.2 5 Urging the abandonment of the dynamite charge, the ABA STANDARDS submit
that it be replaced by a statement of the jurors' duties in the
charge-in-chief, and provide for its repetition in the event of a
deadlock as a supplemental instruction. Without requiring the
use of any particular language, the STANDARDS identify five points
on which the jury might be properly advised:
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may
give an instruction which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must
agree thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another
and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it
can be done without violence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself,
but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with
his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should
not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion
if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction
as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the
opinion of 6his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning
2
a verdict.
25.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY 145 (Approved Draft 1968)

[herein-

after cited as the ABA STANDARDS].

26. Id. Section 5.4 continues at 146:
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree,
the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and
may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The
court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate
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In the federal courts, only three circuits have entirely rejected Allen-the District of Columbia,2 7 the Third Circuit, 28 and
the Seventh Circuit. 29 Elsewhere the Allen charge has either
been modified to include the use of balancing elements or upheld
only in those circumstances where the trial court has strictly con80
fined itself to the language of Allen.
Within the Seventh Circuit, the proscription of the Allen
charge did not commence until as recently as 1969. In United
States v. Brown l the appellant, convicted of certain narcotic offenses, urged on appeal that the Allen charge given by the trial
court sua sponte over the objection of defense counsel had violated his constitutional guarantee of a fair and impartial jury
trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The jury, having
heard evidence for one full day, retired at 11:45 a.m. following
instructions by the court. The jury had deliberated almost five
hours when the judge ordered them back into open court, reread
the original instructions and then gave the jury an instruction
containing the Allen language which was substantially in accord
with the federal LaBuy Instruction.8 2 Without reversing the
conviction the Brown court rejected the contention that the supplemental charge had violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
saying, "No court has held that the Allen instruction itself is unconstitutional. That is what the defendant has asked us to do.
We are unwilling to take this step. '3 3 Nevertheless, the court

concluded,
[i]t would serve the interests of justice to require under our
supervisory power that, in the future, district courts within this
Circuit when faced with deadlocked juries comply with the
standards suggested by the American Bar Association's Trial By
Jury publication ... In order to avoid the potential for prejudice
and coercion to which we have referred, district courts in this
Circuit are required henceforth to charge deadlocked juries in
both criminal and civil cases in a manner consistent with the
84
recommended standards.
for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.
27. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court
en banc held that the charge was coercive and required that the ABA
STANDARDS be complied with in future deadlocked jury situations.
28. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 837 (1969).
29. See note 31 infra and the accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1973)
and cases cited therein; United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1340
(4th Cir. 1970).
31. 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970).
32. Id. at 931. See note 22 supra and the accompanying text.
33. 411 F.2d at 933.
34. Id. at 933-34 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). For a statement of the ABA STANDARD see note 25 supra and the corresponding text.
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The use by the Brown court of the words "in a manner con-

sistent with" the ABA

STANDARDS

was unfortunate.

Although

the intent of the Brown court was undoubtedly to avert continued use of the much criticized Allen charge, the opinion neglected to set forth a permissible instruction or to provide guidelines within which a trial judge might formulate a "consistent"
jury charge.
Thus in United States v. Bambulas35 the court of appeals
was called upon to determine whether the language employed by
the district court in its supplemental instruction was consonant
with the standards required in Brown. Although the court of
appeals affirmed the appellant's conviction finding the supplemental charge proper and "well within the perimeters of
Brown"86 , the opinion offered no language to guide other trial
courts in a similar dilemma.
Shortly thereafter, in United States v. DeStefano37 the court
of appeals was again confronted with determining whether a district court's supplemental charge was "consistent" with the ABA
STANDARDS.
In DeStefano, jury deliberations had commenced
at almost 6 p.m. and ended at 10 p.m. that evening. The next
morning one juror was taken to a health unit shortly after 8 a.m.
to receive medication for an upset stomach. The condition subsided and the juror returned to continue the deliberations at
10:30 a.m. Thirty minutes later, a supplemental charge said to
be in conformity with the Brown decision, was given to the jury.
Though the instruction contained the elements enumerated in the
ABA STANDARDS, the trial court embellished the charge with
several additional phrases including language that the case "must
be disposed of sometime," that the minority reconsider its opinion
in light of the majority view, and that the majority should similarly reexamine its thinking. 8 Holding that the instruction had
not violated the "spirit" of the Brown decision, the appellant's
conviction was affirmed.
A review of post-Brown decisions reveals that Brown had not
succeeded in alleviating the proliferation of appeals which the
use of an Allen-type instruction had promoted. Despite the proscription of Allen charge instructions, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals continued to be called upon to ascertain whether the
jury has been instructed by the trial court in a manner consistent

with the ABA

STANDARDS.

Thus, scarcely surprising was the

result in United States v. Silvern3 9 wherein the court of appeals
35. 471 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 506.
37. 476 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1973).

38. Id. at 332, 333.

39. 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973).
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was once again called upon to approve a supplemental instruction
which was, the court admitted, "exceedingly lengthy" and "far

beyond the ABA STANDARDS." 40

Though affirming the ap-

pellant's conviction, the Silvern court, acting under its supervisory power, declared that district courts within the Seventh Circuit would thereafter be required to instruct both civil and criminal juries as follows:
The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each
juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each
juror agree thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and
to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can
do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must
decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the
course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your
own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous.
But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges-judges of facts.
Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence
41
in this case.
The Silvern holding provided that this supplemental instruction was to be given if the trial court deemed one necessary and
only in those instances where the instruction had been given
prior to the time the jury had initially retired and in a footnote
cautioned that the instruction quoted was the only deadlock instruction to be given. If any supplemental instruction relating
to a deadlocked jury was given which deviated from the Silvern
language, the court concluded, a resulting conviction would be
42
reversed and a new trial ordered.
THE UNCERTAIN DEmIsE OF ALLEN:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ILLINOIS

Proscription of the Allen charge is not endemic to the federal courts. Several state courts have prohibited the use of the
dynamite instruction. Arizona led the way as early as 1959, forbidding the use of the Allen language entirely. 43 One year later
the Montana courts reached a similar result holding in State v.
Randall44 that the giving of the Allen instruction was reversible
40. Id. at 882.
41. Id. at 883. This instruction is identical to Instruction 8.11, Jury
Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal Cases, 27 F.R.D. 39, 97-98
(1961).
42. 484 F.2d at 883.
43. State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959).
44. 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960).
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error even where the counsel for the defense had failed to object.
Alaska, 45 Pennsylvania 46 and Minnesota 47 have recently followed
suit requiring an instruction consistent with the ABA STANDARDS;
and it appears that Kansas, Idaho and Iowa strongly disapprove
48
of and discourage any use of the Allen charge.
As recently as 1968, the Illinois courts began to challenge the
use of the Allen instruction in criminal cases. In People v. Richards 49 one appellate court held that the giving of a deadlock instruction in a criminal case where the jury had informed the
court that it was hopelessly deadlocked constituted prejudicial
error. While refusing to hold that the Allen instruction would
be reversible error in any instance, the Richards court intimated
that the only benefit of such instruction would inure at the risk
of potential prejudice to the accused. It was this reasoning which
prompted the court to conclude that, insofar as criminal proceedings were involved, the use of such an instruction ought not to
be encouraged.
Following the lead of Richards, the Illinois Appellate Court
for the third district, in People v. Mills"° held that any supplemental instruction given to a deadlocked jury in a criminal proceeding would amount to reversible error. In Mills, the appellant had been convicted of obstructing a police officer following
a two day trial. The jury began deliberations at 11:50 a.m. and
reported itself "pretty well hung up on a couple of issues"' at
3:50 p.m. the same day, whereupon the trial court gave the jury
Illinois Patterned Jury Instruction-Civil 1.05. 2 Reversing the
appellant's conviction, the Mills court interpreted the failure of
the drafters of the Illinois PatternedJury Instructions-Criminal
to include a deadlocked jury instruction as deliberate-indicative
of their intent that no such instruction be given in a criminal
setting. 5 The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case, the court reasoned, compelled the conclusion that
a supplemental instruction, though proper in a civil case, is not
54
warranted in a criminal prosecution.
The Illinois Supreme Court was not moved by the reasoning
45. Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (1971).

46. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971).
47. State v. Martin, - Minn. -, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1974).
48. See United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 668 (5th Cir. 1972) and
cases cited therein.
49. 95 Ill. App. 2d 430, 237 N.E.2d 848 (1968).
50. 131 Ill. App. 2d 693, 268 N.E.2d 571 (1971).
51. Id. at 693, 268 N.E.2d at 571.
52. ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ILLINOIS PATTERNED JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL (1961)
[hereinafter cited as IPI].

The IPI-CRIMINAL have no counterpart instruction
for deadlocked juries.
53. 131 Ill. App. 2d at 695, 268 N.E.2d at 573.

54. Id.
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of the Mills court when in People v. Prim55 the court was confronted with an Allen instruction as set forth in the federal LaBuy Instructions.56 Holding that the instructions given by the
trial court did not require reversal, the supreme court stated
that " [w] hile acknowledging the possible coercive dangers inherent in a supplemental instruction given to a deadlocked jury, we
do not feel that a jury should be left to grope in such circumstances without some guidance from the court. ''57 Acting under
its supervisory authority, the Prim court directed that trial
courts faced with a deadlocked jury situation should comply with
the instruction prescribed in the ABA STANDARDS and by implication overruled the Mills holding that no instruction be given
to a deadlocked jury in a criminal prosecution. The Prim opinion, unlike the Brown court's decision in the Seventh Circuit, proceeded to set forth an illustrative instruction which the Prim
court deemed consistent with the ABA STANDARDS. 58 It is noteworthy that the Prim instruction consists of the same mandatory
language required within the Seventh Circuit as set forth in the
Silvern decision. An obvious shortcoming of the Prim opinion,
however, is that the court refused to hold that only this Prim
instruction be given to a deadlocked jury, increasing the likelihood that the Illinois review courts will continue to be called
upon to determine whether an aberrant instruction is consonant
with the Prim holding. Thus the Prim decision, though making
clear that Illinois trial courts are to comply with the ABA
STANDARDS whenever instructions are given to a deadlocked jury
in a criminal case, merely sets forth a permissible instruction
leaving unanswered the propriety of an embellished Prim instruction or whether the Allen language may still be used as part
of the initial jury charge.5 9
SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The substantive or formal aspects of deadlocked jury instructions given in criminal prosecutions in the state and federal
courts within Illinois have received considerable attention by the
courts of review in recent months, and the parameters of permissible instructions are reasonably clear-at least with regard to
55. 53 Ill. 2d 62 289 N.E.2d 601 (1972).
56. Id. at 71. For a statement of the LaBuy Instruction see note 24

supra and the corresponding text.
57. 53 Ill. 2d at 74, 289 N.E.2d at 608.
58. Id. at 75, 289 N.E.2d at 608-9.
59. With regard to this latter point, see People v. Iverson, 9 Ill. App.
3d 706, 292 N.E.2d 908 (1973) where the giving of the Allen charge with
the initial instructions to the jury did not constitute reversible error. In
People v. Casner, 20 Ill. App. 3d 107, 312 N.E.2d 709 (1974) the Appellate
Court for the Second District held that the use of Allen language during
voir dire did not constitute reversible error.
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the minimum content of the supplemental instruction. Less
clear, however, is the result in Illinois review courts where the
trial court has not employed the permissible instruction found
in the dicta of Prim, has departed from the ABA guidelines, or
has embellished an otherwise permissible instruction with additional matters for the jury's consideration. In these instances it
cannot be stated with certainty at what point the language of
the trial court will cease to be "consistent" with the ABA
STANDARDS and amount to reversible error on appeal. Consequently, there are a number of considerations warranting the attention of the practitioner which should not be overlooked.
Among the most significant considerations is the availability
of an appealable error in the event the supplemental instruction
given does not produce a favorable verdict. Should the trial
court determine that the circumstances require a supplemental
instruction, counsel disapproving such an instruction must make
a timely objection. In the federal courts, objection to any supplemental instruction appears to be a prerequisite to any successful
appeal by a defendant who seeks to question the propriety of the
instruction. For example, in Wegman v. United States ° it was
held that since no objection had been taken at trial, the defendant was precluded from assigning as error on appeal the trial
court's supplemental charge. Failure to make a timely objection
was also noted by the review court in Sikes v. United States"'
where the trial court's use of the Allen charge was affirmed. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached the same result
in United States v. Johnson. 2 Most instances where no objection
was made to the court's instruction would fall within the Federal
Rule 30:
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires
to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be
given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury and,
on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury. 63
There are instances where the failure to make objection to
the instruction will not preclude raising the issue on appeal.
Though Federal Rule 5264 provides that any error, defect, or irregularity which does not affect substantial rights of the defendant will be disregarded on appeal, 52(b) states that errors or defects which do affect substantial rights may be noticed by the
reviewing court though counsel did not bring them to the atten60. 272 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1959).
61. 279 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1960).

62. 432 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
63.

64.

FED.
FED.

R. CRiM. P. 30.
R. CRnm. P. 52.
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tion of the trial court. The plain error rule of 52(b) would undoubtedly provide a basis for appealing the supplemental instruction where no objection had been taken, provided counsel was
prepared to show that the instruction had substantially affected
the rights of the appellant. Generally, federal courts of appeal
have not been receptive to this approach and are reluctant to find
plain error in instructions where no objection was made by counsel.6 5 Nevertheless, there are instances where courts of review
have considered the trial court's instruction absent an objection
by counsel. For example, no objection was made by defense
counsel to the supplemental instruction which the court of appeal
considered in Jenkins v. United States.66 The same was true in
67
United States v. Smith.
The result in an Illinois state court would be much the same.
Illinois review courts require that an objection be taken to the
supplemental instruction as a prerequisite to raising the objection
on appeal. 68 It is noteworthy, however, that in Illinois state
courts counsel is not limited to objecting to the instructions prepared by his adversary. Supreme Court Rule 451 (b) permits objection to an instruction without regard to whether the objecting
party had prepared the instruction. This provision will be of
particular importance where counsel has prepared a permissible
instruction, yet believes that the court should not give the jury
a supplemental instruction at that time. (Where, for instance,
it is believed by counsel that any supplemental instruction, regardless of its form, would coerce the jury.) The Supreme Court
of Illinois has also adopted a plain error rule ' 9 identical to Federal Rule 52(b) providing that errors, though not objected to in
the trial court, may be noticed by the reviewing court where substantial rights have been affected. However, like its federal
counterpart, Rule 615(a) is directory-not mandatory, and review courts will rely upon it only in their discretion.
Assuming that objection has been made prior to the reading
of the supplemental charge, thus removing any question of its
usefulness as a basis for appeal, counsel must evaluate the manner in which the supplemental instruction may be attacked.
Among the bases for attacking a supplemental instruction, the
most recurring theme and one to which review courts are most
receptive, is that the instruction was coercive. The grounds for
such an attack may take several forms.
65. See Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963).

66. 330 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 445 (1965).
67. 353 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1965).
68. ILL. S. CT. R. 451(b) (c).
69. ILL. S. CT. R. 615 (a).
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On appeal it may be argued that the language of the instruction itself was coercive. While this type of objection maintains
its vitality in those jurisdictions where Allen charge instructions
are utilized, this ground of attack will not be particularly useful
in state and federal courts within Illinois where the permissible
language which the court may use is greatly restricted and the
content of the supplemental instruction is to a large extent prescribed. The Silvern decision 70 has particularly emasculated this
ground of attack in the Seventh Circuit as it prescribed the precise language to be used by the trial court. Within the limits
of the Prim decision, however, inasmuch as the content of the
instruction was not prescribed, the likelihood that the trial court
may insert coercive language persists. Prim, it will be recalled,

requires an instruction consistent with the ABA

STANDARDS.

Since the ABA STANDARDS do not require the use of any specific
language, merely earmarking five points on which a jury might
'be properly advised, one cannot be certain that the trial court's
instruction will not contain coercive language. Just as Allen
charge instructions have often been embellished with allusions
to the expense attendant to retrial, the delay caused by a mistrial,
etc., it is likely that some courts may similarly wish to append
such language to the ABA guidelines. In such instances, it may
be urged on appeal that the surplus verbage was coercive or that
the appended language and the ABA STANDARDS, taken as a
whole, so operated as to have a coercive import.
Assuming that the language of the instruction cannot be
shown to have been coercive, an argument may still be made on
the ground that the instruction, though not coercive in itself,
was given under such circumstances as to have had a coercive
effect on the jury. This argument is particularly viable in Illinois state courts as well as other jurisdictions which require in-

structions consistent with the ABA

STANDARDS.

The ABA

STAND-

ARDS approve the repetition of the instruction in a hung jury
situation after the jury has reported itself deadlocked.71 Although the coercive language of the Allen charge may have been
eliminated, the ABA STANDARDS perpetuate the type of coercion
inherent in any supplemental instruction. One commentator has
observed that a supplemental charge given to a jury after its deliberations have commenced will be given at a psychological low
point in the proceeding 7 -- a time when the jurors have endeav70. See note 41 supra and the corresponding text. It should be recalled that this language is mandatory and that in any proceeding in

which the district court departs from this instruction an appeal will bring
reversal.
71. See note 26 supra and the corresponding text.
72. Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at
the "Allen Charge",31 U. Cm. L. REv. 386, 388-89 (1964).
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ored without success to reach an agreement based upon the evidence. Under these circumstances any statement by the court
calculated to bring agreement is apt to meet with something less
than critical evaluation by the members of the jury.7 No instruction, regardless of its form, can overcome the psychological
pressure which it will exert on the dissenting jurors to reach a
verdict. Judge Stouder, writing for the majority in Mills recognized the inherently coercive nature of instructions given to
juries unable to agree:
Its message is by necessary implication directed primarily to the
minority juror or jurors or to that group less adamant in its
convictions ....
[T]he benefits to be gained from the giving
of such an7 instruction
are not apparent unless it has some coer4
cive effect.

The length of time following the reading of the instruction
to the deadlocked jury and the return of its verdict may also be
cited to underscore the coercive effect of the supplemental instruction. Where a jury has been unable to agree on a verdict
for a length of time and a verdict is returned shortly after the
supplemental instruction is given, the circumstances may be said
to sustain the inference that the instruction had a coercive effect
-that the jury misinterpreted the instruction as an order by
the court to come to an agreement. Cases dealing with coercion
as evidenced by the prompt return of a verdict do not reveal any
minimum time period within which the return of a verdict will
be deemed, on review, to have been coerced. Nevertheless, in
those situations where a verdict is returned shortly after the supplemental instruction was delivered and the deliberations prior
to the deadlock were lengthy, review courts will be more likely
to find that the trial court's instruction had the effect of coercing
75

the verdict.

It may also be urged on appeal that the supplemental instruction, though not containing offensive language, had a coercive effect in that the charge was given too soon after the jury
had commenced its deliberations or, as frequently occurs that the
73. Id.

74. 131 Ill. App. 2d at 695, 268 N.E.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
75. In United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961) the jury
reported itself deadlocked after a four hour deliberation. An Allen
charge was given and a verdict returned a few minutes later. Reversing
the defendant's conviction, the court of appeals stated:
The time interval was quite long enough for acceptance of a theory
of majority rule, but was hardly long enough to have permitted a
painstaking re-examination of the views which the minority held
steadfastly until the charge was given.
Id. at 436. See also United States v. Smith, 353 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1965)
(verdict returned after 40 minutes); Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d
530, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1964) and Wissell v. United States, 22 F.2d 468, 470
(2d Cir. 1927); but see Moore v. United States, 345 F.2d 97, 98 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
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instruction was given sua sponte by the trial court before the
jury had reported its inability to agree. Where the instruction
is determined to have been given too soon after the jury has commenced its deliberations, the court has interfered with the independent deliberation of the jury. The action by the trial court
may be perceived by the jurors as a cue by the judge that their
verdict is overdue. Such error, of course, will be difficult to substantiate on appeal. Whatever coercive impact the instruction
may have had on the jurors, such evidence will not be found
within the record. Furthermore, the majority of courts which
have dealt with the issue have held that once a verdict has been
returned the affidavits of an individual juror indicating that the
verdict had been coerced are not admissible to overturn the verdict3 6 Polling the jurors 77 when the verdict is returned will provide an opportunity for any juror to indicate that he cannot in
good conscience concur with the verdict of the majority; however, the obvious shortcoming of this device is that few jurors
will admit that they have been coerced into agreeing with the
majority. Furthermore, the failure of the record to show that
any juror wished to change his vote when polled would be a substantial burden to overcome when arguing, on appeal, that the
verdict of the jury had been coerced.
A

FINAL CONSIDERATION

78

In a recent study, former jurors were polled regarding the
extent to which the jurors felt a supplemental instruction had
aided the jury in reaching its verdict. Of those jurors who had
participated in a criminal trial wherein additional instructions
had been given, slightly more than 45 percent of the former jurors reported that they felt the supplemental instruction had not
aided them in returning the verdict. In one county as many as
47.8 percent of the jurors responded that they believed the supplemental instruction had not aided them in reaching the verdict.7 9 These figures cast some doubt on the assertion that supplemental jury instructions are justified as a viable device for
initiating productive deliberations. Furthermore, it has been observed that the average juror approaches his duty with a sense
of responsibility and fairness.80 Though mistrials do involve ex76. 53 AM. JuR. Trial 1109-1116; Annot., 97 A.L.R. 1038 (1935).
77. FED. R. CRnM. P. 31 (d) provides:
When a verdict is returned and before it is recorded the jury shall
be polled at the request of any party or upon the court's own motion.

If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may
be directed to retire for further deliberations or may be discharged.
78. Note, Jurors Judge Justice: A Survey of Criminal Jurors, 3 N.
MEx. L. REV. 352 (1973).
79. Id. at 359.

80. Note, note 24 supra at 146.
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pense, create delay, and must contribute to the congestion of
court calendars-considerations not to be cavalierly dismissed,
there is little reason to criticize a hung jury where it is the consequence of the conscientious deliberation of responsible, fairminded jurors unable to agree that the evidence proves the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, available
data suggest that a deadlocked jury resulting in mistrialthough an important phenomenon-is not of sufficient magnitude to impair the efficient administration of justice. Recalling
that only about one-seventh of all felony prosecutions result in
a trial by jury and that as few as five percent of those jury trials
are likely to end in a mistrial from a hung jury, the instances
where a deadlock is not the result of genuine disagreement based
upon the evidence seems particularly remote. Less remote is the
likelihood that the otherwise deadlocked proceeding will be infected with error from the delivery of an improper instruction
necessitating the expense and delay of an appeal which if the proponent is successful will result in a new trial. On the other hand,
where no supplemental instruction is given, the mistrial which
would ultimately follow the deadlock would also in most instances lead to a retrial. Such a procedure would obviate the
necessity of an appeal which might otherwise burden an accused
and, more importantly, would underscore the integrity of our
system of justice by preserving the high regard which the law
has always accorded the dissent of a minority. Viewing the infrequency of the deadlocked jury situation, recognizing that most
jurors will endeavor to perform their duties fairly and conscientiously, and noting that the responses of a substantial number
of jurors interviewed have cast serious doubt on the assistance
supplemental instructions provide in aiding the jury reach its
verdict, it is submitted that the trial court as well as the prosecution and defense counsel seriously consider whether any supplemental instruction is warranted when the jury indicates its inability to reach a verdict. In spite of the effort by many courts
and the proponents of the ABA STANDARDS to eliminate much
of the coercive substance of supplemental instructions, no language addressed to a deadlocked jury can eliminate the inherent
coercion which even a balanced instruction must place upon a
dissenting minority. The very act of delivering one of the numerous palliatives to a deadlocked jury is itself an invasion into
the province of the jury since it rejects the conclusion of the jurors that they cannot come to a unanimous verdict based upon
the evidence. Moreover, assuming an instance may unfold where
one stubborn juror refusing to cooperate or to participate in honest deliberations stands in the way of a unanimous verdict, it is
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not likely that such a juror will yield to the blandishments of
a supplemental instruction."'
CONCLUSION

Though the United States Supreme Court has consistently
declined to overrule the Allen case8 2 the courts of review, acting
under their supervisory power, have emasculated this ancient
precedent. Today in both the federal and state courts in Illinois
the language of Allen is no longer recognized as a permissible
supplemental instruction. Whether or not the mandatory language of Silvern will provide a viable alternative in the Seventh
Circuit is uncertain. Similarly, one may only speculate as to the
ultimate parameters of a permissible instruction within the state
courts-for the Illinois courts of review, in the wake of Prim,
must determine on a case by case basis whether a particular trial
judge's language can be said to be consistent with the ABA
STANDARDS.
It is probable that review courts will continue to
focus upon the language of the instruction, reversing where it
is felt the wording is coercive, declining to reverse where the language does not suggest a coercive import. Apart from their sensitivity to coercive language within the supplemental charge, it
is likely that the review courts within Illinois will continue to
overlook the inherent coercion of a supplemental instruction;
that subtle pressure on the jurors to return a verdict which no
rephrasing or balancing can overcome. This type of coercion is
a very real phenomenon and should not be ignored merely because it cannot be discerned from a review of either the record
or the evidence. While vast inroads have been made since the
days when deadlocked juries were carried about in oxcarts, a
painstaking re-examination of the nature of the supplemental instruction and its effect on the independent deliberation of the
jury may be justified.
Thomas H. Senneff

81. Id.
82. C. WRIGHT, 2 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 502 (1969).

The

Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari on numerous occasions
when Allen was at issue. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d

621 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1970); United States v.

Johnson, 432 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); An-

drews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 946 (1963).

